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Automated negotiation has attracted increasing interest and received phenomenal attention in the 
area of electronic market (e-market). Most of the studies on the automated negotiation focused on the 
distributive (zero-sum) negotiation, and their effectiveness is only illustrated in a single-issue 
negotiation between software agent-to-software agent interaction. In this study, we propose an offer 
strategy model of integrative negotiation for an automated negotiation agent and focus on software 
agent-to-human interaction. Our offer strategy model is based on the integrative approach and 
negotiation theory, which emphasize the importance of exchanging information among negotiators 
and multi-issue negotiation including package offers helping to achieve an integrative (win-win) 
outcome. In developing this model, we are incorporating negotiation strategy of argumentation-based 
negotiation and negotiation tactic of multiple equivalent simultaneous offers as an offer strategy to 
achieve an integrative (win-win) negotiation outcome. We expect that the result from applying the 
offer strategy model becomes more attractive and persuasive, thus may increase negotiation outcome 
satisfaction for both economic measure and social-psychological measure. 
Keywords:  Automated negotiation, software agent, integrative negotiation, argumentation-based 
negotiation, multiple equivalent simultaneous offers, offer strategy 
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Introduction 
Negotiation is a pervasive activity and arises in areas of professional lives (e.g., business, government, 
non-profit organizations, legal proceedings, and nations) and private lives (e.g., parenting and 
everyday life) as well. Negotiation is defined as procedures for resolving opposing preferences between 
parties, which involves discussion between parties with the goal of reaching an agreement (Carnevale 
& Pruitt, 1992). Negotiations are complex phenomena that are evident from many different scientific 
disciplines that deal with negotiation problem from very different perspectives (Vetschera, 2013). It is 
often difficult for human negotiators to identify and make trade-off necessary to reach optimum 
outcomes due to their limited information processing capacity and capability, cognitive biases, and 
social-emotional obstacles (Yang, Singhal, & Xu, 2009). Hence, negotiation underwent a paradigm 
shift from the traditional method, such as face-to-face negotiation, to automated negotiation that 
implements artificial intelligence knowledge. Besides that, the paradigm shift was also due to the 
rapid growth of electronic markets (e-markets) requiring an enhancement entity that can assist 
human business decision-makers.  
Automated negotiation is defined as a form of interaction in which a group of agents with conflicting 
interests and desire to cooperate comes to a mutually acceptable agreement on the division of scarce 
resources (Jennings et al., 2001; Rahwan et al., 2003). Agents are a group of software agents that 
perform certain tasks together. The software agent is a component of software and/or hardware that is 
capable of acting rigorously in order to accomplish tasks on behalf of its user (Nwana & Ndumu, 1998) 
and a self-contained program competent of analyzing its own decision making and reaction based on 
its own observation of the current environment in achieving one or more objectives (Jennings & 
Wooldridge, 1996). There are three key features of software agents that led to the implementation of 
automated negotiation; (1) they act on behalf of other entities in an autonomous fashion; (2) they are 
able to be reactive and proactive in deciding on undertaking an action; and (3) they exhibit some level 
of such capabilities as learning, co-operation and mobility (Kersten & Lai, 2010). The involvement of a 
software agent in automated negotiation can be distinguished into two types: (1) agent-to-agent 
negotiation, in which a software agent acts on behalf of one party and negotiates with another agent 
acting for the counterpart, and (2) agent-to-human negotiation, in which a software agent acts on 
behalf of one party and negotiation with a human counterpart (Yinping & Singhal, 2009). 
Most of the studies on the automated negotiation focused on the distributive (zero-sum) negotiation, 
and their effectiveness is only illustrated in a single-issue negotiation (Yang et al., 2009). A single-
issue negotiation is the negotiation situation with only one winner, whereby the negotiators will push 
for a settlement close to the counterparts' resistance point and claims the largest part of the settlement 
(Yang et al., 2009; Zeng & Sycara, 1998a, 1998b). In 2009, a study on the integrative negotiation for a 
software agent and human was conducted. The study examined the key strategic negotiation 
parameter on “what” offers can be proposed to strive the integrative negotiation (Yang et al., 2009). 
The negotiation parameter of “what” refers to the technique of the offer used in the negotiation 
strategy. They proposed a new negotiation strategy model, namely multiple equivalent simultaneous 
offers and accepted with delay. This model consists of two strategy techniques: (1) multiple 
equivalent simultaneous offers, which means making multiple offers that are mutually equivalent at 
each around, and (2) accepted with delay, which employs delay acceptance rather than immediate 
acceptance of a counteroffer (Yang et al., 2009). The result showed that the proposed negotiation 
strategy model worked effectively in achieving integrative negotiation for both economic and social-
psychological outcomes (Yang et al., 2009). Despite such effort, designing the negotiation strategy for 
integrative negotiation still has room for improvement. The improvement that we are working on is 
how to enhance persuasiveness in offer-making to achieve integrative negotiation outcome, i.e., win-
win negotiation settlement. 
We aim at setting up a research agenda on an enhancement offer strategy model of the integrative 
negotiation. The offer strategy model is based on the multiple equivalent simultaneous offers of 
automated negotiation agent for software agent-to-human negotiation. According to social-
psychological analysis, a negotiator can be more persistent and persuasive on the value of an offer 
using the multiple equivalent simultaneous offers technique (Yang et al., 2009). Therefore, we are 
interested in studying on the additional element that can be incorporated with multiple equivalent 
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1) How to make the argumentation to enhance the persuasiveness of an offer? 
2) Will the approach of argumentation in multiple equivalent simultaneous offer strategy 
enhance the outcome of negotiation?  
 
We plan to implement the offer strategy model of integrative negotiation into the decision algorithms 
that are programmed in the automated negotiation agent. Then, we will do an experiment of the 
automated negotiation agent in the e-market environment and test its capabilities. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The aim of integrative negotiation (also known as “non-zero-sum-game or win-win game”) is to 
achieve a mutually beneficial agreement that maximizes settlement efficiency and fairness under 
appropriate conditions (Yang et al., 2009). Integrative approaches employ objective criteria to create 
the condition of mutual gain and emphasize the importance of exchanging information among the 
negotiators (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). The notable contribution of integrative negotiation was 
described by Walton and McKersie. According to them, this is a negotiation approach in which 
negotiators employ problem-solving behavior (Walton & McKersie, 1965) that refers to a state of 
desire for finding a solution to the problem to reach a definite goal. Phase theory in the integrative 
school views the negotiation process as qualitatively distinct sub-process (phases) that sets the texture, 
momentum, and potential of the negotiation (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008).  
The basic concepts of negotiation are strategy, tactics, reservation point or bottom line, and Zone of 
Agreement or Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). Strategy is a careful plan or method, especially for 
achieving the negotiation goal. Meanwhile, tactic is referred to as the skill of using available means to 
reach the negotiation goal (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). For example, in the distribution strategy 
negotiation, the negotiator may use the coercion1, opening strong2 or salami tactic3 as their tactics to 
achieve a desired negotiation outcome. Reservation point or bottom line is a point beyond which the 
negotiator will not go and instead breaks off the negotiation. A ZOPA is an overlap between the 
maximum purchase the buyer is willing to make and the minimum sale price that the seller is willing 
to accept (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). When ZOPA exists, there is a possibility that the negotiation 
may come to a mutually acceptable agreement. 
The social influence is a topic that has been researched in social-psychology field. Social influence 
occurs when the behavior by a person has the effect or even just the intention of changing another 
person’s behaviors, emotions, or opinion about a stimulus (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). Social influence 
acts as an umbrella term for persuasion. Persuasion consists of four essential elements: (1) 
establishing credibility, (2) framing/argumentation to find common ground, (3) providing vivid 
evidence, and (4) connecting emotionally (Conger, 1998; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Social 
influence through persuasion is more likely to be successful to satisfying wants and needs for everyone 
(Brinol & Petty, 2009). The social-psychology analysis showed that a negotiator could be more 
persistent and persuasive regarding a value of an offer by using multiple equivalent simultaneous offer 
strategy (Thompson, 1990; Yang et al., 2009). Framing/argumentation is one of the essential 
elements of persuasion; therefore, it would be motivating to integrate argumentation-based 
negotiation into the proposed offer strategy. On the other hand, the values of an offer can be more 
attractive. Underpinned by the social influence, the context of our research model is described below 
in concerning (1) argumentation-based negotiation, (2) multiple equivalent simultaneous offers as an 
offer strategy and (3) best alternative to an agreement as an offer strategy. We then describe how our 
expectation of negotiation outcome changes when the software agent makes that offer strategy.  
Offer Strategy  
An offer strategy is a plan of action connected to the decision of a negotiator in making offers. To 
achieve the integrative negotiation outcome, we propose an offer strategy model that incorporates two 
elements in negotiation: (1) strategy - argumentation-based negotiation and (2) tactic - multiple 
equivalent simultaneous offers technique. Furthermore, for reservation point, we use the Best 
                                                             
1 Using force, or the threat of force to wrestle concession from an opponent (Saner, 2000) 
2 Starting out with a position that is higher than what you realistically estimate you can achieve (Saner, 2000) 
3 Prolonging a negotiation to a painstakingly slow pace, only giving a very small concession to the other side when 
it can no longer be avoided in order to placate the other side for a little while longer (Saner, 2000) 
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Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) which is a parameter to be used in the experiment. 
The offer strategy model is based on the integrative approach and negotiation theory, which 
emphasize the importance of exchanging information among negotiators (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008) 
and multi-issue negotiation including package offers helping to achieve an integrative (win-win) 
outcome (Husted Medvec, Leonardelli, Galinsky, & Claussen-Schulz, 2005).  
Argumentation-based Negotiation (ABN) 
Argumentation theory is the interdisciplinary study of how deductions can be reached across logical 
reasoning. The logical reasoning is based on claim, sound or not, and on premises4. It includes the arts 
and science of civil debate, persuasion, dialogue, and conversation (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
2004). Arguments constitute the major part of real-life negotiations on personal matter (e.g., a fight 
between family members over which TV channel to watch), up to business deal (e.g., a contract 
between the supplier and the retailer). In the context of negotiation, an argument is viewed as a piece 
of information that may allow an agent to justify its negotiation standpoint and influence another 
agent’s negotiation standpoint (Rahwan et al., 2003). For example, in trade union dispute, an agent 
representing the workers’ union might refuse an offer for a modified pension plan by the 
organization’s management; as a response, the management agent might offer a different pension 
plan (Rahwan et al., 2003) to persuade a workers’ agent to have win-win settlement because the agent 
can accept, reject or critique the offer. Two aspects make it necessary to incorporate arguments into 
the negotiation model: (1) argumentation is a tool in the negotiation for the agent to gather 
information and disclose information strategically to adjust its utility functions and to update its 
beliefs about counterpart (Lopes et al., 2014), and (2) in reality, agent frequently has limited (as 
opposed to zero or full) knowledge of its opponent, and argumentation is used by an agent to 
exchange information strategically (Lopes et al., 2014).  
Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers (MESO) 
The multiple equivalent simultaneous offers (MESO) technique was proposed as an alternative to 
basic strategy – a sequential-single offer5. The MESO technique allows a negotiator to make multiple 
offers which are mutually equivalent at each round. For example, a software vendor presents three 
similar software packages to a client simultaneously: $1 million software package with payment in 30 
days, the same software package for $1.5 million with payment in 120 days, or an enhanced software 
package for $1.35 million with payment in 30 days. Negotiation theory and previous research have 
revealed that multi-issue negotiation including package offers is superior in achieving integrative 
outcome (Husted Medvec et al., 2005). Prior studies have shown that people who highly value choice 
preferred multiple options rather than having a single alternative (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) and 
suggested that integrative benefits can be achieved when both sides are using MESO (Husted Medvec 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, an experiment of human-to-human negotiation showed that MESO 
technique had better acceptance rate and improved opponent’s satisfaction towards the offer (Husted 
Medvec et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2009). 
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement 
The objectives in any methods of negotiation are to protect the negotiator against making an 
agreement that they should reject and to help them make the most of the assets they have so that any 
agreements reached will satisfy negotiators’ interests as far as possible (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011). 
To achieve this objective, Fisher and Ury from the Harvard Program on Negotiation (PON) have 
developed a guideline called Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Fisher et al., 2011). 
BATNA provides negotiators with measures of flexibility where the negotiation can continue even 
when the desired settlements are rejected because the negotiators are freer to continue to explore 
additional possible solutions (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). BATNA needs to be assessed and developed 
before and during the negotiation process. Therefore, it is crucial for negotiators to know their BATNA 
before and throughout all stages of a negotiation. Fisher and Ury list three distinct operations to 
generate the possible BATNA (Fisher et al., 2011). These are inventing a list of actions the negotiator 
might conceivably take if no agreement is reached; improving some of the most promising ideas and 
converting them into practical alternatives; and selecting, tentatively, one option that seems the best 
                                                             
4 A premise is an assumption that something is true (The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition). 
5 An offer strategy when a negotiator adopts a concession-based approach by starting with a tough offer, and 
concedes by making by offers of a lower self-utility sequentially in subsequent rounds (Yang et al., 2009) 
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(Fisher et al., 2011). Integrative negotiation is viewed as a joint decision-making process. Therefore, 
there is always a possibility of the negotiators reconsidering their position in mid-stream and deciding 
to pursue a different course from the one initially planned. 
 
Negotiation Outcome 
The objective of negotiations is to reach an outcome that satisfies both parties. Negotiation outcomes 
can be measured by two categories: economic measure – generally, the actual allocation of negotiated 
resources that result from the negotiation encounter, and social psychological measure – the 
subjective social perceptions held by negotiating parties following the encounter (Oliver, Balakrishnan, 
& Barry, 1994; Thompson, 1990).  
Economic Measures 
The economic measure assesses the actual allocation of negotiated resources based on the efficiency. 
Normally, negotiation outcomes are summed to form a measure of joint efficiency (Thompson, 1990). 
Joint efficiency refers to the extent to which the negotiators’ joint payoff approaches to frontier (Yang 
et al., 2009). The basic theory to measure the joint efficiency is Pareto Efficiency. Pareto Efficiency, 
also known as Pareto Optimal, is a state of allocation of resources further from which it is impossible 
to make any negotiator better off without making another negotiator worse off. Joint efficiency can be 
measured by calculating the distance from the settlement point to the Pareto Optimal agreement 
(Tripp & Sondak, 1992). The smaller the Pareto Efficiency distance is, the better the process efficiency 
is. By using the proposed offer strategy, we propose the following hypothesis:     
H1: Compared to MESO, the joint efficiency will be improved (Pareto Efficiency distance is smaller) 
when the software agent makes MESO with ABN. 
Another variable that is used in economic measures is the settlement ratio. Settlement ratio refers to 
the number of successful or unsuccessful negotiation cases over the total number of negotiation cases 
(Tripp & Sondak, 1992). The higher success rate of settlement ratio is the better the process efficiency 
is. By using the proposed offer strategy, we propose the following hypothesis:     
H2: Compared to MESO, the settlement ratio (success rate) will be higher when the software agent 
makes MESO with ABN. 
Social-Psychological Measures 
Social-psychological measures the negotiation performance based on social perception concept that 
includes most aspects of perceivers’ social worlds: people, their behaviors, and situation (Thompson, 
1990). Perception of negotiation situation refers to a negotiator’s judgments on the negotiation 
process and outcome, such as his/her judgment of the fairness of the process and outcome of 
negotiation. It also includes the view of the negotiation structure task: purely competitive, cooperative 
or integrative (Thompson, 1990). Perception of other party refers to a negotiator’s judgment towards 
his/her negotiation opponent, such as intelligence, sociability, expertise, skill, ability, cooperativeness, 
and competitiveness of his/her opponent (Thompson, 1990). By using the proposed offer strategy, we 
posit the following hypotheses:      
H3: Compared to MESO, the human negotiator has a greater satisfaction with the negotiation 
process and outcome when the software agent makes MESO and ABN. 
H4: Compared to MESO, the human negotiator has a higher perceived cooperativeness towards the 
software agent when the software agent makes MESO and ABN.  
The desire for future negotiation refers to the negotiator’s subject evaluation on the perception of 
negotiation situation and the perception of the other party. Satisfaction with current negotiation 
situation may influence the negotiator to work together in the future. By using the proposed offer 
strategy, we expect this following hypothesis:     
H5: The human negotiator’s satisfaction with the negotiation process and outcome as well as the 
perceived cooperativeness of the software agent is encouragingly connected with the desire for 
future negotiation. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study implements a design science research method. Design is a problem-solving paradigm that 
seeks to create innovation, define ideas, practices, technical capabilities, and products through which 
the analysis, design, implementation and use of the information system can be effectively and 
efficiently accomplished (Hevner et al., 2004).  Design science research in Information Systems must 
produce an artifact in the form of either construct, model, method, or instantiation (Hevner et al., 
2004). The research approach in this study consist of two methods: 
1. Prototype/IT artifact - We will develop the negotiation interface as IT artifact. Besides that, 
we will also develop a decision algorithm that is programmed in the automated negotiation 
agent for the software agent-to-human negotiation. The software agent represents the seller, 
and the human is the buyer. The development of IT artifact is to answer our first research 
question.  
2. Laboratory experiment- A 2x2 experimental study will be designed to test the hypotheses. The 
experiment is divided into three stages of procedures. The three stages are pre-negotiation, 
during negotiation, and post-negotiation. In the pre-negotiation stage, participants will be 
briefed about the general instructions and procedure of the experiment. In the second stage, 
the negotiation stage, the participants will negotiate with the automated negotiation agent 
until they reach an agreement or until the negotiation is terminated without an agreement, 
whereby the participants reject the automated negotiation agent's final offer. Lastly, the post-
negotiation stage occurs upon completion of the negotiation task. Participants are asked to 
record the negotiation settlement. During the post-negotiation, the participants are required 
to complete the questionnaire reflecting on their social perceptions held by negotiating parties 




This study attempts to extend the previous study on multiple equivalent simultaneous offers as an 
offer strategy for the automated negotiation agent to achieve an integrative negotiation outcome. In 
developing an offer strategy model of integrative negotiation, we propose to use the multiple 
equivalent simultaneous offers as a negotiation tactic and argumentation-based negotiation as a 
negotiation strategy. The previous study demonstrated that the negotiation tactic of multiple 
equivalent simultaneous offer is effective in achieving an integrative negotiation outcome. The aim of 
this study is to integrate the argumentation-based negotiation with multiple equivalents simultaneous 
offer technique. Consequently, the offer becomes more attractive and may increase negotiation 
satisfaction both economically (joint efficiency and settlement ration), and from the social physiology 
perspective (perception to negotiation situation, perception of other party and desire for future 
negotiation) as well. It supports the objective of integrative negotiation, which focuses on problem 
solving, value creation, and communication. 
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